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- <text id=91TT1884>
- <title>
- Aug. 26, 1991: Gulf War:They Didn't Have to Die
- </title>
- <history>
- TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1991
- Aug. 26, 1991 Science Under Siege
- </history>
- <article>
- <source>Time Magazine</source>
- <hdr>
- NATION, Page 20
- GULF WAR
- They Didn't Have to Die
- </hdr><body>
- <p>Desert Storm's fratricidal casualties point to the need for a
- better system of friend-or-foe identification
- </p>
- <p> The death of a soldier is always tragic, but never more so
- than when he is mistakenly cut down by his own comrades. Last week
- the Pentagon confirmed that 35 of the 145 Americans killed in
- action during Operation Desert Storm, and 72 of the 467
- wounded, were victims of "friendly fire." Moreover, U.S. fire
- destroyed seven M1A1 tanks and 20 of the 25 Bradley Fighting
- Vehicles lost in battle, and even raked the battleship Missouri.
- All told, the rate of so-called fratricidal casualties among
- U.S. troops was 10 times as high as in any other battle
- recorded during this century.
- </p>
- <p> How could the same high-tech fighting force that plucked
- enemy missiles out of the sky and sent smart bombs down the
- Iraqi Air Ministry's ventilation shaft also inflict such carnage
- on its own troops? The answer lies partly in the circumstances
- of this particular campaign and partly in the nature of modern
- warfare. In the words of Marine Corps Lieut. General Martin
- Brandtner, the Pentagon briefer, the abnormal level of
- friendly-fire incidents was due to "a combination of featureless
- desert terrain; large, complex and fast-moving formations;
- fighting in rain, darkness and low visibility; and the ability
- to engage targets from long range."
- </p>
- <p> Visibility was a key factor. Not only were there more
- critical nighttime encounters than ever before, but during
- heavily overcast days troops relied on infrared heat-sensitive
- imaging devices that provide only a fuzzy image at great
- distances. Though the M1A1's new 120-mm cannon was found to be
- lethal at 3,500 yds., for example, targets were difficult to
- identify at that range through the infrared optics.
- Paradoxically, the very effectiveness of America's modern
- precision-guided munitions made them far more murderous than
- Iraqi fire when aimed at the wrong target. On one occasion, a
- depleted-uranium 120-mm cannon round penetrated and exited an
- Iraqi tank chassis and still had enough power to inflict
- casualties on a nearby American unit. The laser guidance system
- on the Hellfire missile, fired from Apache helicopters, almost
- never missed and accounted for one of the killed Bradley
- vehicles.
- </p>
- <p> A more basic explanation for the friendly-fire accidents,
- however, is the failure of all the military services to come to
- grips with the Identification Friend-or-Foe problem. In 1980 the
- Pentagon established a joint-services IFF development program
- at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton; a decade later,
- there is not much to show for it.
- </p>
- <p> The Desert Storm casualties give these efforts a new
- urgency. After Army helicopters fired on Marine vehicles in the
- Khafji battle early in the gulf war, American forces resorted
- to crude measures like taping inverted V's on friendly vehicles
- and installing tiny transmitter beacons. But the U.S. has yet
- to meet the technical challenge of deploying an IFF system that
- cannot be emulated or neutralized by enemy forces.
- </p>
- <p> By Bruce van Voorst/Washington
- </p>
-
- </body></article>
- </text>
-
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